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Fast Patrol Boats were considered a negligible threat when the U.S. Navy focused
on blue water operations away from shore. Now that the Navy's focus has shifted to the
littorals, where these ships patrol, the Fast Patrol Boat's potential as a credible adversary is
gaining acceptance. Moreover, the threat may be greatly enhanced if Fast Patrol Boats
employ Commercial Off-The-Shelf Command and Control equipment to coordinate their
efforts. This paper presents the design and results of a wargaming experiment conducted
with Batman & Robin at the Naval Postgraduate School to examine this issue.
The research question is how would U.S. Navy Surface Action Groups perform
against Fast Patrol Boats equipped with Commercial Off-The-Shelf Command and Control
equipment which enables these comparatively unsophisticated ships to conduct coordinated
attacks. The experiment also looked at two other factors: Surface Action Group work load,
which might exacerbate the offensive capability of Fast Patrol Boats conducting
coordinated attacks with advanced Command and Control; and the quality of information
our Surface Action Groups are provided which could likewise play a pivotal role in a
confrontation or engagement.
A two-cubed factorial experiment was conducted to test seven hypotheses. Data
were collected on ten performance measures for 128 trials total. Significant results were
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Fast Patrol Boats (FPB) have always been an effective platform for littoral warfare.
With today's advanced commercial off-the-shelf command and control (C2 ) technology, the
threat FPBs pose to the U.S. Navy could drastically increase. Effective C2 would enable
FPBs to conduct coordinated attacks using sophisticated tactics that could saturate a Surface
Action Group's (SAG) defenses.
In addition, the small size and high speed of FPBs combine to complicate
intelligence gathering and increase the work load on SAG operators trying to maintain an
accurate surface picture of the littoral environment.
The main research question is the effect that coordinated attacks by FPBs,
employing advanced C 2 , will have in an engagement with a U. S. Navy SAG operating in
littoral seas. Also of interest are the effects, and their interactions with the main effect, of
two elements which accompany the presence of FPBs and a littoral operating area:
increased work load and incomplete information.
FPB C 2 was modeled by varying the tactical coordination of the FPBs between high
and low. High coordination was modeled by three concurrent waves of attacks of FPBs
with most of the FPBs in a restricted emissions status. Low coordination was modeled by
sequential attacks of FPBs. Work load was modeled by varying the number of neutral ships
in the vicinity of the attack. High work load scenarios contained 24 neutral ships in the
operating area while low work load scenarios contained only nine. Information
completeness was modeled by varying the completeness of the maritime intelligence reports
that the SAG received during the trial. High information completeness was represented by
providing the subjects with a ratio of hostile ships in each threat sector to the total number
of ships in the threat sector. Low information completeness was represented by only
providing the total number of ships in each threat sector.
A two-cubed factorial experiment was conducted to test the seven hypotheses (three
main hypotheses plus four secondary hypotheses examining all possible interactions). Eight
Persian Gulf scenarios were developed on the wargame simulator Batman & Robin as a
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context for the experiment. The wargame has two modes of operation: Batman, where
scenarios are executed, and Robin, where scenarios are developed. Each scenario
represented a unique combination of the three factors at two levels. Sixteen subjects from
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) participated in the experiment. Each subject played
each scenario using Batman once. Trials (8 x 16 = 128) were run at four times real time and
were completed in 38 minutes.
In each scenario the Blue force SAG was comprised of three combatants and five
helicopters. Red forces were comprised of nine FPBs. The subjects controlled the Blue
order of battle. Red order of battle was scripted in Robin during scenario development but
could deviate from the script in Batman according to its pre-programmed artificial
intelligence.
Ten performance measures were automatically generated by Batman & Robin at the
end of each trial and were used to test the hypotheses. The data analysis plan includes use
of frequency plots, box plots, MANOVA, univariate ANOVA, interaction plots, residual
plots, and non-paramtetric statistics to assess the data. A significance level of a = 0.05 was
established to test all null hypotheses.
Hypotheses tests show significant results in the main hypotheses and several
interaction hypotheses over a broad range of performance measures. The most important
findings are condensed as follows:
• When the FPBs had high C 2 , fewer were detected, however, of those detected
the range of detection was greater.
• When the FPBs had high C 2 , fewer were destroyed, but those that were
destroyed were done so at a greater range.
• The range at which the FPBs were detected and destroyed both decreased when
work load increased.
With complete information the FPBs were destroyed at a greater range.
xvi
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This chapter discusses the purpose and scope of the experiment and closes with the
organization of the rest of the thesis.
A. PURPOSE
This section lays out the purpose of the experiment by describing the problem in
real world terms. This leads to a statement of the research question, and the approach taken
to examine the problem. The three main factors and their levels are discussed with
anticipated results provided.
1. Real World Problem
As more and more navies turn away from blue water naval strategies that
necessitate sophisticated and expensive multipurpose combatants and toward regional and
littoral dominance, the fast patrol boat's utility as a cost effective naval platform for littoral
warfare increases [Ref. 1]. Coupled with the availability of commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) command and control (C 2 ) technology, fast patrol boats present a unique challenge
to the U.S. Navy and the traditional maritime powers still operating large naval combatants
built for blue water operations [Ref. 2].
Moreover, the U.S. Navy frequently deploys Surface Action Groups or SAGs (task
groups comprised primarily of combatants) throughout the littoral regions of the world.
Despite the fact that SAGs have organic helicopter assets, without the protection of an
aircraft carrier's air wing they are vulnerable to stealthy, formidably armed fast patrol boats
(FPB).
'
The FPB's small size and high speed combine to complicate intelligence gathering.
In addition, U.S. Naval combatants are not optimized to track, target and neutralize small,
fast surface platforms, nor can they still assume the dominant tactical advantage inherent
1 The helicopter asset in mention is the LAMPS MK III SH-60B Seahawk. Currently the Seahawk has no lethal
ASUW capability. The SH-60B Block I upgrade will have a forward firing weapon's capability. It is scheduled
for fleet introduction by 1998 [Ref. 3].
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with superior C 2 [Ref. 4]. Still employing forces specifically designed for blue water
warfare, the U.S. Navy is caught in the middle of this shifting paradigm and appears slow to
react to the FPB threat in the littorals [Ref. 5].
2. Research Question
FPBs already possess speed and stealth advantages over most combatants. The
main research question concerns the effect that coordinated saturation attacks by FPBs,
employing advanced C 2 , will have on an engagement with U. S. SAGs operating in littoral
seas. Also of interest are the effects of increased workload and incomplete intelligence,
both of which accompany the presence of FPBs in a littoral operating area, and their
interactions with the main effect.
3. Approach
A three factor experiment was constructed involving human decision makers. All
factors were presented at two levels, high and low, resulting in a two cubed factorial
experiment. The experiment was designed and executed on the Battle Management
Assessment System and Raid Originator Bogie Ingress wargame, more commonly called
Batman and Robin (B&R). The wargame has two operational interfaces. In Robin,
scenarios are developed and edited. In Batman, scenarios are executed and operational
performance is measured. Eight different scenarios were generated in Robin to present all
combinations of levels of factors. Each scenario was then administered to 16 Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) officer students using Batman, for a total of 128 trials. The
geographic location of each scenario was identical: the Persian Gulf, between the Straits of
Hormuz and Bahrain. Red forces were comprised of nine OSA II FPBs. A three combatant
SAG composed of one Kidd class destroyer, two Spruance class destroyers, and five SH-
60B Seahawk helicopters constituted Blue forces. All forces were armed and equipped
realistically. The three design variables or factors were:
a. Information Completeness
For high information completeness, the maritime intelligence was
represented by a ratio of hostile ships in a threat sector to the total number of ships in the
threat sector. For low information completeness, only the total number of ships per threat
sector was given.
b. Workload
High workload scenarios were characterized by 24 neutral ships and nine
hostile FPBs in the operating area. Low work load scenarios had nine neutral ships and
nine hostile FPBs in the operating area.
c. FPB C2
The third factor was FPB C 2 . This is not only the primary factor of interest,
but also the original impetus for the experiment. The analysis will focus on this factor.
Two levels of FPBs C 2 were achieved by varying their tactical coordination between high
and low. High coordination was modeled by three concurrent waves of attacks of FPBs.
For this case, seven of the nine FPBs were in restricted emission control (EMCON) status
with the remaining two in an unrestricted EMCON status. It was assumed that coordinated
attackers would share information about their enemy, the U.S. SAG in this case, and thus
require fewer emissions. Low coordination was modeled by sequential attacks of FPBs
with only two of the nine FPBs in a restricted EMCON status and the remaining seven
emitting.
4. Anticipated Results
The hypothesized results were that friendly (Blue) forces would perform better
when the following occurred:
• Information or intelligence reports were complete.
The ship's combat team was experiencing low workload conditions.
Incoming attacks were uncoordinated (sequential) vice coordinated (concurrent).
B. SCOPE OF THE EXPERIMENT
The complexity of the scenarios for this experiment was limited due to time
constraints and the varied backgrounds and limited operational experience of some of the
subjects. 2 Blue Force resources were initialized in the same manner for every scenario and
for every subject. This standardization was done to reduce the risk of subjects with
operational experience gaining an advantage by relying on their expert knowledge to
position their forces. In addition, certain artificialities were accepted in the interest of
practicality and usability. For instance, the wargame was run at a speed of 4:1 (i.e., 4
seconds of simulated time = 1 second of real time). Therefore a 152 minute simulated event
could be compressed into 38 minutes of real time. All scenarios were constructed similarly
except to allow for the systematic introduction of both levels of all factors. Scenarios were
constructed to appear different to the subjects without affecting essential traits. This
diminished the chance of subjects relying on- prior scenario knowledge to game the
scenario instead of making decisions based on current scenario developments.
C. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II introduces the
design of the experiment including the set-up, subjects, hypotheses, assumptions, statistical
design of the experiment, and measures. Chapter III describes the data, how the raw data
were collected and transformed, the data coding scheme, and data reduction phase. Chapter
IV presents the data analysis plan, results of the data analysis and demographic information
on the subjects. Chapter V presents conclusions including results of hypotheses tests and
their real world meanings. Finally, Chapter VI offers recommendations to change, improve
upon, and extend this experiment for the future.
2 The experiment had to be set-up, played, and recorded in the 50 minute class period.
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II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
This chapter discusses experimental set-up and presents the seven hypotheses that
are associated with this two-cubed experiment. In addition the assumptions, statistical
design, and measures of the experiment are explained.
A. SET - UP
In this section the software, hardware, and subjects are discussed. B&R was chosen
because of the ease and speed with which scenarios could be generated and modified. It
addition, it has a superior graphical user interface and artificial intelligence which allows
pre-scripted Red forces to deviate from the script in Batman and behave opportunistically.
Finally, B&R has an automatic data collection capability which is very useful in the data
collection phase.
1. Software and Hardware
B&R software was obtained from the creator of the wargame, Dr. Pat-Anthony
Federico, at the Naval Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC), San Diego.
It is written in the "C" programming language. B&R was installed in the NPS Systems
Technology Lab (STL) on five Sun Sparc-20 stations and runs in a UNIX Solaris 2.5
environment. All scenarios were created in Robin on one Sparc station and ported to the
other four to ensure standardization. Each subject executed each scenario in Batman
independently of other subjects. B&R is not capable of running in a multi-player
networked configuration.
2. Subjects
Sixteen officers participated as subjects in the experiment. Before the experimental
trials commenced, all were given a 50 minute standardization overview brief of: SAG
tactics, platform capabilities, sensor and weapon performance parameters, weapon status
and weapon posture meanings, and B&R rules. This was done for standardization purposes
and in an effort to mitigate learning effects. Each subject was administered two practice
trials followed by the eight experimental trials in which data was collected. During the
practice trials, subjects received one-on-one instruction on B&R from trained proctors. All
trials were completed during a ten day period due to course requirement constraints at NPS.
Subjects were limited to three trials per day to preclude fatigue. Subjects were not permitted
to discuss their trials with other subjects before, during, or after trials. The experiment was
conducted in a controlled environment with physical dividers placed on both sides of each
subject's computer station. Demographic information was collected on all of the subjects
for future stratification analysis (see Chapter IV.B.4. for more information).
B. HYPOTHESES
Ten performance measures (PMs) or dependent variables were recorded for each
trial. For a description of the PMs see Section G. The following hypotheses were tested for
each PM:
H01 : Information Completeness has no impact on SAG performance.
H
a ,
: Information Completeness impacts SAG performance.
H02 : Work Load has no impact on SAG performance.
H
a2 : Work Load impacts SAG performance.
H03 : FPB C 2 has no impact on SAG performance.
Ha3 : FPB C 2 impacts SAG performance.
H04 : The combined effect of Information Completeness and Work Load has no
impact on SAG performance.
Ha4 : The combined effect of Information Completeness and Work Load impacts
SAG performance.
H05 : The combined effect of Information Completeness and FPB C 2 has no
impact on SAG performance.
H
a5 : The combined effect of Information Completeness and FPB C
2 impacts
SAG performance.
• H06 : The combined effect of Work Load and FPB C 2 has no impact on SAG
performance.
• Ha6 : The combined effect of Work Load and FPB C 2 impacts SAG performance.
• H07 : The combined effect of Information Completeness, Work Load and FPB C 2
has no impact on SAG performance.
• H
a7 : The combined effect of Information Completeness, Work Load and FPB C 2
impacts SAG performance.
The significance level for null hypotheses rejection was set at alpha = 0.05. For
convenience, these hypotheses are repeated in Appendix I.
C. ASSUMPTIONS
Four assumptions were made at the outset of the trials:
• Scenario outcomes represent the subject's ability to act on or react to the cues
displayed by Batman.
• The ten performance measures (dependent variables) chosen from Batman's
automatic data collection capability adequately identified the impact or
influence of the factors (independent variables) and their interactions on the
outcome of each scenario.
• The subjects' performance will be normally distributed and all populations will
have the same variance.
• The scenarios are designed to measure the subjects' performance over the
dynamic range of the performance curve.
D. STATISTICAL DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT
The experiment was counter-balanced to negate any learning effect remaining after
the practice trials. The two-cubed design of the experiment yielded eight unique scenarios.
Using 16 subjects and a completely randomized block design with 2 replications yielded an
8x16 output matrix. To construct the design matrix, the scenario type, order of scenario
presentation and subject's assignment to a scenario presentation were all randomized. This
triple randomization was accomplished using one 8x8 Latin Square for rows 1-8; the
Latin Square was composed of the letters a-h. A duplicate Latin Square was then inverted
and used to create rows 9-16. Using 'APL2' programming language, unique random
numbers were randomly assigned to the eight columns and then ordered. The same process
was carried out for the 1 6 rows. Since the initial scenario numbering scheme was a function
of the original order of generation and included numbers greater than 8, the scenarios were
renumbered arbitrarily from 1-8. Those numbers were then randomized and assigned the
letters a-h. As a last step, we used a manual random number generator to randomly assign
the subjects to the rows. B&R has a utility function enabling the administrator to assign
subjects to classes, scenarios to tests, and finally, classes to tests. Assignments were based
on the outcome of the counter-balancing process. This function minimized the chance of
error inherent with administering 160 trials (32 training and 128 experimental trials).
E. MEASURES
B&R's automatic data collection feature allowed 81 performance measures (PMs)
or dependent variables to be collected after each trial. The 81 PMs are divided into two
broad categories: Blue Forces' performance vs. Red Forces, and Red Forces' performance
vs. Blue Forces. Each of these two broad categories is further divided into 3 sub-categories:
air forces vs. surface, surface forces vs. surface, and combined air/surface forces vs. surface.
Not all 8 1 PMs were applicable to this experiment. After a winnowing process the data was
reduced to 10 PMs. Of the 10 PMs selected the first five measure Blue Forces'
performance and the second five measure Red Forces' performance. The PMs used are
defined as follows:
• BAFP 1 : FPBs detected by Blue Air (%).
• BAFP 2: Average range (measured from nearest Blue force ship) at which
FPBs were first detected by Blue Air (nm.).
• BSP 3: FPB's destroyed by Blue Surface (%).
• BSP 4: Average range (measured from nearest Blue force ship) at which FPBs
were destroyed by Blue Surface (nm.).
• BAFP 12: Number ofTAO weapon assignments (count). 3
• A 1 : Blue Air detected by the FPBs (%).
• SI: Blue Surface detected by the FPBs (%).
• A 2: Average range (measured from nearest FPB) at which Blue Air was first
detected by the FPBs (run.).
• S 2: Average range (measured from nearest FPB) at which Blue Surface was
first detected by the FPBs (nm.).
• A3: Blue Air destroyed by the FPBs (%).
3 Blue forces had to utilize the TAO function in order to fire their weapons and engage Red forces. This number
represents the number of salvos launched by the operator per trial.
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III. DATA DESCRIPTION
This chapter discusses the data collection and transformation process, the data
coding scheme, and the data reduction phase.
A. DATA COLLECTION AND TRANSFORMATION
Although B&R calculated values for the PMs automatically, hardware limitations
prohibited the automatic transfer of data to a file. Instead, each subject manually recorded
their performance data displayed on the monitor to the PM data collection sheet at the end
of each scenario. The large number of subjects participating at a given time precluded
quality control while the subjects were recording their data. The information was then
manually entered into Excel®. Before any data manipulations were performed, the data
were put through a rigorous quality control process to check for data input errors. Data
reduction was then performed and the data ported from Excel into Minitab® for statistical
analysis. Once the data were in Minitab it was checked again for accuracy.
B. EXAMPLES OF RAW DATA
Appendix A contains an example of a subject's PM data collection sheet (a PM
sheet was generated after each trial). Notice that all 81 possible PMs were recorded on the
PM data collection sheet. This was done so the data could be recorded quickly and
accurately. As stated previously, only 10 PMs were actually used in the subsequent
analysis. Appendix B contains a sample of the master data spreadsheet. The spreadsheet
contains data for each of the 16 subjects organized by trial number, scenario number, and
PMs results. Scenario numbers are described in the next section.
C. DATA CODING SCHEME
Each of the eight scenarios was uniquely described by the level, high or low, of each
of the three factors: Information Completeness ( I ), Work Load ( L ), and FPB C
2
( C ).
This information was coded as a three digit number with each digit either a '2' (high) or a
11
' 1
' (low). Once the data from a PM sheet was entered into Excel, the scenario from which
it was generated was referred to by this three digit code (see Appendix B, columns 3, 4, and
5). For example, the scenario with I, L, and C at the high level is coded 222. The scenario
with all factors at the low level is coded 111. Referencing sub-section I.A.4., we anticipated
scenario 2 1 1 (high or complete information, low work load, low FPB tactical coordination)
would produce the best results for Blue forces.
D. DATA REDUCTION
Initial data reduction was performed by reducing the 81 PMs which B&R was
capable of producing for this experiment to the ten projected to be most relevant (see
section II.E.). This was accomplished before the data collection phase. B&R automatically
converts a subject's performance to percentages, counts, and average distances and then
lists them as performance measures. After the data collection phase the ten selected PMs
were checked to ensure sufficient variability existed to warrant continuing with the analysis
phase. Most of the PMs chosen produced good distributions.
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IV. ANALYSIS
This chapter discusses the overall analysis plan and presents the results of the
analysis. The information in this chapter is quite detailed and necessary for a complete
understanding of the results. A summary of findings is presented in the Conclusions
(Chapter V).
A. ANALYSIS PLAN
Initial data analysis utilized frequency plots to obtain a pictorial representation of
the 128 data points per PM (16 subjects x 8 scenarios). This established an initial feel for
the data and provided insight for further detailed analysis. The shape of some of the plots
may call into question our initial assumption of normality. Next, box plots were used to
examine the three factors' individual impacts on the PMs. After a working understanding
of the data was obtained, three factor MANOVA was used as a screening device, and since
not all PM distributions appeared normal, parametric and non-parametric ANOVA,
interaction plots and residual plots were used to conduct a detailed analysis. A significance
level ofa = 0.05 was used to test all null hypotheses. When the data did not appear normal,
non-parametric ANOVAs were conducted over the factors suggested by MANOVA,
parametric ANOVA, or the box plots.
B. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
Detailed results of the analysis presented in this section include frequency plots and
the corresponding descriptive statistics, box plots, ANOVA, two-way interaction plots, and
residual plots. In addition, the results of preliminary analysis performed on the
demographic information is included.
1. Frequency Plots and Descriptive Statistics (see Appendix C for plots)
BAFP 1 (FPBs detected by Blue Air (%)): Almost all FPBs were detected by Blue
Air throughout the experiment. This is not surprising; Blue Forces had five helicopters to
conduct Surface Search Surveillance and Coordination (SSSC).
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BAFP 2 (Average range at which FPBs were first detected by Blue Air (nm.)): The
average range that Blue Air first detected the FPBs was 71 nm. measured from the nearest
Blue force ship.
BSP 3 (FPB's destroyed by Blue Surface (%)): Overall 75% of the FPBs were
destroyed. BAFP 1 and BSP 3 plots suggest that not all FPBs were destroyed even though
almost all were detected. This is probably because Blue Forces expended their limited
Harpoon inventory (8 weapons per ship) or were not able to position themselves within gun
range due to the time constraints of the experiment.
BSP 4 (Average range at which FPBs were destroyed by Blue Surface (nm.)): Blue
Surface destroyed the FPBs at an average range of 30 nm. measured from the nearest Blue
force ship (Harpoon range is 5-75 nm.; gun range is 1-15 nm.).
BAFP 12 (Number of TAO weapon assignments (count)): The average number of
TAO weapon assignments per game was approximately 19 (i.e., the number of salvos
launched by the operator per trial).
A 1 (Blue Air detected by the FPBs (%)): All Blue Air platforms were detected by
the FPBs in most of the trials. Blue Air assets were required to come within the FPBs'
surveillance envelopes to positively identify contacts as hostile.
S 1 (Blue Surface detected by the FPBs (%)): Overall 23.19% of Blue Surface
platforms were detected by the FPBs. This is due in part to EMCON restrictions used by
some FPBs.
A 2 (Average range at which Blue Air was first detected by the FPBs (nm.)): The
average range that the FPBs first detected Blue Air was 45.3 nm. Measured from the nearest
FPB.
S 2 (Average range at which Blue Surface was first detected by the FPBs (nm.)):
The average range at that the FPBs detected Blue Surface was 17.4 nm. Measured from the
nearest FPB. By combining plots SI and S2, it is apparent that the FPBs and Blue Surface
platforms operated at distances greater than their surveillance areas. The initial separation
of Blue Surface and the FPBs at the start of the game was great enough so that neither
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would be in the other's sensor range. This was done to force Blue to rely on the helicopters
and intelligence provided to locate the FPBs.
A 3: (Blue Air destroyed by the FPBs (%)): Overall 21% of Blue Air was destroyed
by the FPBs. Blue Air was susceptible to the FPBs' surface to air missiles while
conducting visual identification. Electronic Surveillance Measures (ESM) information
when available to Blue, may have made subjects more vigilant when operating air assets in
the vicinity of unknown surface platforms. Without this information, the percentage of
Blue Air destroyed could have been higher.
2. Box Plots (see Appendix D for plots)
As described earlier, the experiment examined the effects of three factors at two
levels. Box plots were used to determine if there were significant differences between the
distributions of the PMs for the two levels of treatment for each of the three factors. Box
plots present a pictorial representation of the key features of the data: median, first and third
quartiles, and spread. Significant differences in these features could indicate differences in
the location or spread of the PM distribution when factor levels are altered. Within the
context of these box plots, significant implies a non-trivial visual difference in the box plot
with respect to the median and the first and third quartile. If differences were identified,
ANOVA was conducted to gain additional insight.
Four sets of box plots were generated for each PM. The first three correspond to
individual factors. The boxes labeled with a 1 represent the 64 data points corresponding to
the low level of the factor, whereas those labeled with a 2 represent data for the high level
of each factor. The fourth set of box plot graphics contain eight box plots representing the
eight unique scenarios (each scenario's box plot contains 16 data points). It is coded in
accordance with the data coding scheme described earlier. The box plots were used as a
tool to help corroborate or refute the rejection of a null hypotheses and to gain insight into
the nature of any effects.
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3. ANOVA / Interaction and Residuals Plots (see Appendices E and F for
plots)
This sub-section builds on the results of the analysis based on the frequency plots
and box plots and uses the additional statistical tools described earlier to make the case for
acceptance or rejection of the null hypotheses (see Appendix I) for each PM.
BAFP 1 (FPBs detected by Blue Air (%)): The Normal Plot of the ANOVA
Residuals (NPR) suggests the data does not behave normally. This possibility is
corroborated by the Histogram of the ANOVA Residuals Plot (HRP) and the ANOVA
Residuals vs. ANOVA Fits Plot (RFP). ANOVA yields a p-value for C of 0.000. This
implies that H03 should be rejected, however, due to the non-normality of the data we can
not reject H03 based on ANOVA. The Kruskal-Wallis (K-W) non-parametric ANOVA,
which does not require normality, was conducted and also yielded a p-value of 0.000.
Based on the combined result, we reject H03 . It makes sense that the level of C2 would have
an impact on Blue Air's ability to detect the FPBs. The difference in means for CI and C2
is 98.09% detected and 90.10% detected respectively. Nothing else of significance was
found.
BAFP 2 (Average range at which FPBs were first detected by Blue Air (nm.)): The
NPR, HRP and the RFP all indicate that the data is normal. ANOVA yields a p-value of
0.001 and 0.000 for L and C respectively. The box plots show a median value for BAFP2
that is approximately the same for LI and L2, however, the mean value of detection is more
than 3 nm. greater when the workload is low (73.02 vice 69.63nm.). For these reasons we
reject H02 . H03 is also rejected, however, the operational rational is not so intuitive. The
boxplots show a significant difference in both mean and median with Blue Air detecting the
FPBs further out at C2 probably because there was more time between engagements to
move own forces out. The p-value for the LxC interaction is 0.059. Although this is very
close to the significance level, the null hypothesis for H04 will not be rejected. The
Interaction Plots (IP) for LxC reveals little interaction. The p-value for IxLxC is 0.003.
This leads us to reject H07
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BSP 3 (FPB's destroyed by Blue Surface (%)): The p-values based on ANOVA
suggests not rejecting any null hypotheses except of H03 (p-value =0.000). NPR, HRP, and
the RFP all show the data to deviate from the normal. Hence, we will not base our decision
on ANOVA but instead on K-W. K-W yields a p-value of 0.000 for H03 ; on that evidence
we reject H03 . For H03 , the box plots for CI and C2 (medians = 88.89% and 66.67%
respectively) indicate that fewer FPB's were killed by Blue forces when under a
coordinated attack (C2). This supports our primary expectation that Blue forces will
perform worse when attacked in mass by FPBs using COTS C 2 . The IPs show no
interactions exist for IxL, IxC, and LxC (p-values are 0.460, 0.460, 0.715, respectively)
BSP 4: (Average range at which FPBs were destroyed by Blue Surface (nm.)):
NPR, HPR, and the RFP all indicate normal behavior of the data. The p-value for I (0.047)
indicates H01 should be rejected. The descriptive statistics indicate a significant difference
between the means II and 12 (28.5nm and 31.78nm respectively). Therefore H
,
is rejected.
We expect that with good information Blue forces will kill the enemy further out. For L
and C the p-values also make the case to reject H02/03 (0.001 and 0.002 respectively). The
single factor box plot for L shows that Blue destroyed the FPBs further out when the load
was light as we expect. The impact that factor C displays follows from BAFP2: since Blue
Air detected the FPBs further out at C2, the FPBs destroyed were done so at a greater
distance. This makes operational sense: if the enemy is detected further away then it can be
destroyed at or near the outer limit of the weapon's range. For all these reasons we reject
H02/03 . IxC yields a p-value of 0.011. The IP also suggests rejecting H05 by showing a
strong interaction between I and C therefore we reject H05 . This synergy between I and C is
most apparent when C is high and can be explained as follows: when the enemy's attack
plan is organized it is easier to predict, from present positional information, future
movements based on extrapolation and to detect the enemy earlier (i.e., at a greater range)
than when the attack is less coordinated (more random). IxL, LxC and IxLxC all have p-
values »0.05. The IP for IxL and LxC confirms the acceptance of H04/06 by showing little
to no interaction.
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BAFP 12 (Number ofTAO weapon assignments (count)): NPR, HPR, and the RFP
all indicate normal behavior of the data. The p-value for C is 0.000. The single factor box
plot for C reveals a significant difference between the median number of TAO weapon
assignments for CI and C2 (23 and 18 count respectively). A likely reason for fewer
weapon assignments being made when Blue was under a coordinated attack follows from
BAFP 1 : since fewer FPBs were detected when Blue was under a coordinated attack, fewer
could be targeted. For these reasons we reject H03 . No other p-values suggest rejecting a
null hypothesis.
A 1 (Blue Air detected by the FPBs (%)): NPR, HPR, and the RFP all indicate non-
normal behavior of the data. ANOVA yields a p-value of 0.012 for factor C. K-W yields a
p-value of 0.02. The single factor box plot for C shows that the FPBs detected far fewer
helicopters when they were conducting a coordinated attack (this was expected since seven
of the nine FPBs were in EMCON for C2). For these reasons H03 is rejected. ANOVA for
LxC (H06) yields 0.032. The IP for LxC shows that more helicopters were detected by Red
when the load for Blue was low (for both high or low C). The possible reason: when the
load was low the helicopters were more accurately vectored to the FPBs. The IP for LxC
also shows that when the load was high the percentage of helicopters detected by Red was
about the same regardless of the level of C. For this we can find no clear operational
explanation.
S 1 : (Blue Surface detected by the FPBs (%)): NPR, HPR, and the RFP all indicate
normal behavior of the data, however, the initial frequency plot of S 1 suggests the data
may not be useful because there are only three Blue ships to detect. ANOVA yields a p-
value of 0.003 for C. The single factor box plot for C registers a significant difference
between CI and C2 (medians = 33.0% and 17.0% respectively) confirming the low p-
value's indication that we reject H03 (when C was high most of the FPBs were in EMCON).
IxC p-value is 0.047. The IP also supports rejecting H05 , however, the full operational
explanation of the interaction displayed is unclear. When C is low the percentage of Blue
Surface detected by the FPB's increases when Blue has complete information (Blue closes
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the distance with Red more promptly with complete information therefore Red also
becomes aware of Blue's presence). When C is high the opposite occurs. Perhaps this is
because there are more unintentional encounters between Blue and the FPBs when
information is incomplete.
A 2: (Average range at which Blue Air was first detected by the FPBs (nm.)):
NPR, HPR, and the RFP all indicate normal behavior of the data. ANOVA yields only one
p-value below the cutoff: LxC = 0.000. The IP for LxC also suggests rejecting H06 . The
operational explanation of the nature of the interaction between LxC is unclear.
S 2 (Average range at which Blue Surface was first detected by the FPBs (nm.)):
During 24 of the 128 trials Blue Surface was never detected by the FPBs (this occurred
seven times at C 1 and 1 7 times at C2), unfortunately, that left the data set incomplete for
this parameter.
4 The initial frequency plot and the box plots indicate that the data is not
normal. The p-value for K-W with C as the factor was 0.081. The most we can say is that
the mean value at which the FPBs detected Blue Surface is 17.42 nm. measured from the
nearest FPB. The mean values for CI and C2 are 17.7 and 17.08, respectively.
A 3 (Blue Air destroyed by the FPBs (%)): The initial frequency plot indicates the
data is skewed to the right. The NPR and RFP also indicate that the data is non-normal.
ANOVA yields a p-value of 0.002 for C. K-W for C yields 0.053; not quite small enough
to reject H03 . The mean percentage of helicopters destroyed for CI and C2 (15.4% and
26.9% respectively) indicates that when the FPBs conducted a coordinated attack more
helicopters were destroyed. This may follow from the fact that, although we could not
reject H03 for A2 (ANOVA p-value=0. 1 64), the single factor box plot for C of that factor
revealed a similar finding with the FPBs detecting Blue air further out when conducting a
coordinated attack versus a non-coordinated attack (medians = 42 and 47nm. respectively).
4 Analyzing the 24 times that Blue Surface was totally undetected using a chi-square test leads to rejecting the null
hypothesis that Blue Surface is equally likely to go totally undetected for both CI and C2 (p-value of 0.024). The
estimated probabilities of Blue Surface going totally undetected are CI: 0.1 1 and C2: 0.27.
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It also makes sense that we will lose more scouts when the FPBs are in an EMCON status
because Blue Air must enter the FPBs weapons envelope to positively identify them. The
IP for LxC reveals when the FPBs were coordinated in their attack and Blue forces work
load was high, more helicopters were destroyed. We already know C has an impact, but
this indicates that Blue Air assets were not managed as carefully or prudently when the
work load on Blue was high.
4. Demographic Information
Of the 16 subjects, eight were USN, five were USMC, two were USAF, and one
was USA. Six of the eight naval officers were surface warfare officers. Thirteen of the 16
subjects were students in the Command, Control, and Communications (C 3) curriculum at
NPS. Years of service ranged from 5-16 years. A demographic questionnaire was
completed by each subject during the overview brief; the questions were as follows:
1. Name
2. Rank / Branch of Service
3. Designator / MOS Description
4. Number of Years on Active Duty
Subjects were asked to rate on a scale of from one (poor) to ten (expert) their:
5. Level of Proficiency with Navy Tactical Data System (NTDS) symbology
6. Level of Proficiency with Simulation / Wargames
7. Level of Proficiency as Tactical Action Officer (TAO)
8. Level of Computer Proficiency
The answers to questions four through eight are discussed below:
• The distribution of the years of service was skewed toward more senior officers
(see Appendix G, Figure 1 for details).
• The question on NTDS symbology was asked because the symbology used in
B&R is very similar to NTDS symbology; it was presumed that familiarity with
similar symbology would give a subject an advantage in adjusting to the
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wargame. As expected, the distribution of the responses to this question were
bimodal with ten of the sixteen subjects evenly split between the top end of the
scale and the bottom end (see Appendix G, Figure 2 for details).
Experience with wargames was chosen early on as a factor that could influence
a subject's performance. The responses to the question regarding wargame
experience appears to approach a normal distribution with responses skewed
slightly toward more experience (see Appendix G, Figure 3 for details).
Another factor that was anticipated to impact performance was proficiency as a
TAO. Since a TAO qualification is specific to SWO only, we assumed that the
distribution would be skewed toward the more proficient side since the
participant group contained a wide range of warfare specialties. A full fifty
percent of respondents claimed the lowest level on the proficiency scale (see
Appendix G, Figure 4 for details).
Finally, the data pertaining to the level of computer proficiency was evaluated.
The data for this question appears to have a normal distribution skewed toward
the less proficient end, with seventy five percent of the respondents claiming





This chapter discusses hypotheses results and provides a summary of the most
significant results. In addition, corresponding real world interpretations are offered. The
previous chapter was predominantly organized by PMs. This chapter is organized by the
factors and interactions (hypotheses) and focuses on significant findings. Findings are also
condensed and presented in table form in Appendix H (Null Hypotheses Rejection
Summary).
A. HYPOTHESES RESULTS
All three factors and three out of four of their interactions produced significant
effects, although not for all PMs. All significant effects are described below.
1. Information Completeness
H01 had a significant impact on one PM: The average range at which the FPBs were
destroyed by Blue Surface (BSP 4); p = 0.047, 31.8 nm. when information was complete,
and 28.5 nm. when information was incomplete. With complete information Blue forces
were able to kill the enemy over 3 nm. further out than with incomplete information.
2. Work Load
H02 had a significant impact on two PMs: The average range of detection (BAFP 2);
p = 0.001, 69.6 nm. when Blue work load was high, and 73.0 nm. when work load was low.
The average range at which the FPBs were destroyed (BSP 4); p = 0.001, 27.4 nm. when
Blue work load was high, and 32.9 nm. when Blue work load was low. In both cases Blue's
performance was adversely affected (range decreases) when work load increased.
3. FPB C 2
H03 had a significant impact on the following seven PMs:
• Percentage of FPBs detected by Blue Air (BAFP 1); p = 0.000, 90.1% detected
when FPBs were coordinated, and 98.1% detected when the FPBs were not
coordinated.
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•Mean range of detection of the FPBs (BAFP 2); p = 0.000, 76 nm. when FPBs
were coordinated, and 66.6 nm. when FPBs were not coordinated.
Percentage of FPBs destroyed by Blue Surface (BSP3); p = 0.000, 65.5%
destroyed when the FPBs were coordinated, and 84.9% destroyed when the
FPBs were not coordinated.
Mean range at which the FPBs were destroyed by Blue Surface (BSP 4); p =
0.002, 32.8 nm. when the FPBs were coordinated, and 27.5 nm. when the FPBs
were not coordinated.
Number of TAO weapon assignments (BAFP 12); p = 0.000, 17.0 assignments
when the FPBs were coordinated, and 22.3 assignments when the FPBs were
not coordinated.
Percentage of Blue Air detected by the FPBs (A 1); p = 0.012, 93.9% detected
when the FPBs were coordinated, and 97.9% detected when the FPBs were not
coordinated.
Percentage of Blue Surface detected by the FPBs (S 1); p = 0.003, 19.3%
detected when the FPBs were coordinated, and 27.1% detected when the FPBs
were not coordinated.
When the FPBs used high C2 fewer FPBs were detected by Blue, however, of those
FPBs detected the range of detection by Blue was greater. Similarly, when the FPBs had
high C 2 fewer were destroyed, but those that were destroyed were done so at a greater range.
It only makes sense that if they were not detected they could not be killed, and if they were
detected further out, that they would be killed further out.
But why would fewer be detected and yet, those detected, be detected at greater
range? The answer to this is inherent in the scenario design and is two fold. When the
FPBs had high C 2 , they conducted a coordinated (concurrent) attack versus an
uncoordinated (sequential) attack with seven of the nine FPBs in EMCON. Without the
FPBs radiating they were more difficult to detect, but due to their more structured
organization Blue had more time to prepare and deploy forces.
Fewer TAO assignments were made when the FPBs used high C 2 . This explains
why fewer FPBs were destroyed when C 2 was high. Analyzing the operations from the
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FPBs perspective reveals that the FPBs detected fewer Blue Air and Surface platforms
when they used high C 2 . This is a direct result and a potential disadvantage of the high C 2
,
EMCON tactics.
4. The Combined Effects of Information Completeness and FPB C2
H05 had a significant impact on one PM: Mean range at which the FPBs were
destroyed by Blue Surface (BSP 4); p = 0.011. When the FPBs were conducting non-
coordinated attacks, information completeness had no effect. But when the FPBs used
coordinated tactics, the FPBs were destroyed at a much greater range when Blue had
complete information, 36.5 nm., than when Blue had incomplete information, 29.0 nm.
This indicates that when Red was in EMCON, good intelligence (complete information)
became more valuable.
5. The Combined Effects of Work Load and FPB C 2
H06 had a significant impact on one PM even though neither factor taken alone was
significant for that PM.
Mean range at which Blue Air was first detected (A 2): Additional analysis does
not yet help explain why the FPBs detected Blue Air further out when conducting
coordinated attacks: p = 0.000, 46.14 nm. compared with 44.56 nm. when conducting non-
coordinated attacks.
6. The Combined Effects Of Information Completeness, Work Load, and
FPBC 2
H07 had a significant impact on one PM.
Average range of detection of the FPBs (BAFP 2): No attempt was made in this
analysis to interpret this interaction.
B. SUMMARY OF MOST SIGNIFICANT HYPOTHESES RESULTS
• When Blue forces had complete information
• FPBs were destroyed at a greater range.
• When Blue forces were under low work load
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• FPBs were detected and destroyed at a greater range.
• When FPBs attacked with high C 2 :
• The number detected and destroyed decreased, and
• The range of detection and destruction increased.
C. REAL WORLD MEANING
The fact that subjects had five helicopters scouting in a geographically constrained
littoral region probably reduced the importance of judicious resource allocation and thus
lessened the effect of information completeness. In essence, the subjects had nearly total
radar coverage provided by the helicopters regardless of where they directed them.
FPB C 2 levels caused changes in more PMs than any other factor. Probable causes
include:
• FPBs were in EMCON when C 2 was high which greatly affected their ability to
see and be seen.
• When FPB C 2 was high their tactics differed greatly than when their C2 was low.
In the former case, the FPBs converged on Blue in three concentric waves,
thereby massing forces for saturation attacks. In the latter case, the attack was
more sequential and random. The net result might be that even though Blue was
able to conduct a more methodical and deliberate counterattack when the FPBs
had high C 2 they could not detect as many and therefore could not kill as many.
26
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter proposes ways in which to improve and extend the experiment.
A. CHANGES TO THE EXPERIMENT
The experiment could be improved by more realistically modeling information
completeness and work load. Reducing the number of helicopters would help determine if
information completeness is modeled correctly. Fewer resources would force the operator
to allocate them more judiciously. Work load could be varied between high and low based
on real world maximum and minimum shipping levels in the scenario's geographic area to
ensure applicability to present day operations. The FPB threat is an emerging one so it will
be more difficult to find real world data on which to model FPB C 2 and tactics but this
aspect of the study should be pursued.
Due to time and human resources constraints a limited pilot study was conducted
(seven different subjects, three trials each). A larger pilot study would help ensure the
factors are modeled more accurately and the PMs (dependent variables) are capturing the
dynamic range of the performance curve.
A more homogeneous group of subjects (preferably surface warfare officers) would
help to further reduce the impact of the learning effect and ensure that all of the subjects
were starting with the same baseline knowledge of naval tactics.
Configuring the software to automatically store and transfer each subjects' trial data
would have expedited the data collection process and would have protected against
transposition errors in the data.
B. CONTINUATION OF THE EXPERIMENT
The easiest way to extend this analysis is to segregate subjects by warfare specialty,
service, or other demographic factor and then analyze the data accordingly. For instance,
this would help determine if the changes in the levels of information were not registered in
more PMs because of inaccurate modeling, or a cancellation effect due to certain subjects
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utilizing the scripted message information prudently and others acting regardless of
message content. Other ways include: replicating the experiment on another simulation
system to show the affects ofB&R artifacts, using different scenarios to neutralize scenario
effects, or investigating different factors or different levels of studied factors.
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APPENDIX A. PM DATA COLLECTION SHEET
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Figure 1. PM Data Collection Sheet
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APPENDIX B. EXCEL WORKSHEET
Name Trial I L C BAFP1 BAFP2 BSP3 BSP4 BAFP12 Al SI A2 S2 A3
Subl 1 1 2 1 10000 57 89 66.67 2083 26 80 16 67 58 50 16.00
2 2 1 1 100.00 60.67 66.67 15 17 30 100 50 00 41.80 20.00
3 1 1 2 100.00 79.33 55.56 18.80 16 100 33 33 47 60 21 00
4 1 2 2 77.78 69.00 44.44 18.25 10 100 16.67 45.28 24 00 80
5 1 1 1 100.00 57.33 77 78 15.86 20 100 33 33 4040 17 50
6 2 2 1 88.89 61.62 66.67 15.83 21 100 50.00 50.00 16.67
7 2 1 2 100.00 66.78 44.44 18.50 18 80 50 00 47.25 19.67
8 2 2 2 10000 59 78 66 67 19 67 19 80 33.33 44 00 21 00
Sub 2 1 2 2 2 10000 8056 66 67 38.17 19 100 0.00 4600 N 20
2 1 2 2 77.78 79.57 88.89 25.75 20 100 33.33 38.40 17.00 100
3 2 1 1 100.00 66.56 88.89 32.12 26 100 33.33 49.80 19 50 20
4 2 1 2 100.00 8278 88.89 54.62 19 100 0.00 4840 N 40
5 2 2 1 100.00 67.33 88.89 29.25 32 16 67 60.00 14.00 20
6 1 2 1 100.00 70.56 100 00 32.00 25 100 33 33 40 00 19 50 20
7 1 1 2 100.00 89.56 66.67 25.67 38 100 50 00 49.60 16.33 40
8 1 1 1 10000 6922 100 00 34 89 27 100 16.67 31 00 14.00 20
Sub 3 1 2 2 2 8889 7625 77 78 4000 12 100 0.00 4440 N
2 2 1 1 100.00 70.56 8889 37 75 13 100 0.00 4900 N
3 1 2 2 66.67 69.33 55.56 31 60 12 100 16 67 44.40 24.00 60
4 1 1 2 100.00 79.67 66.67 38.57 18 100 0.00 58.20 N 20
5 2 2 1 100.00 63 67 8889 19.62 22 100 33 33 49 00 20.00 20
6 1 1 1 100.00 62 00 88.89 25.62 26 100 33 33 38.60 19.50
7 2 1 2 8889 7662 8889 31 12 21 100 33.33 42.40 20.00 20
8 1 2 1 100.00 6000 100 00 19 44 28 100 33.33 49 00 17.50 20
Sub 4 1 1 1 1 100.00 64 56 8889 39 12 16 100 000 41 00 N
2 1 2 2 77.78 67 57 33.33 35.67 7 100 000 37.00 N 80
3 2 1 2 8889 8175 77 78 56.29 9 100 000 5000 N
4 2 1 1 100.00 72.65 88.89 32.38 15 100 16 67 30 60 17 00 20
5 1 2 1 100.00 74.67 77.78 2671 21 100 33.33 40 00 17 00 20
6 2 2 1 100.00 71 11 88.89 27.62 22 100 33 33 42 60 20.00 20
7 1 1 2 100.00 94.44 77.78 53.29 10 100 0.00 50.40 N 40
8 2 2 2 100.00 77 56 77 78 4657 9 100 0.00 2640 N
Sub 5 1 2 2 1 100.00 56 44 77 78 2286 16 100 16.67 53.00 17.00 20
2 2 1 2 100.00 70.56 77.78 37.00 23 100 0.00 3900 N
3 1 1 2 100.00 68.33 66.67 21.67 17 80 16 67 45.00 18.00
4 1 2 2 88.89 6300 5556 15.60 22 100 33 30 40 20 17 00 80
5 2 2 2 100.00 78.11 55.56 2868 16 100 16.67 41.00 14.00 40
6 1 2 1 88.89 63.62 77.78 28.57 12 100 16.67 3940 14.00 20
7 2 1 1 77.78 6843 77.78 28.57 13 100 16 67 39 80 14 00 60
8 1 1 1 100.00 7178 10000 46.11 17 100 0.00 40.00 N 20
Figure 2. Worksheet, Subjects 1-5
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Name Trial I L C BAFP1 BAFP2 BSP3 BSP4 BAFP12 Al SI A2 S2 A3
Sub 6 1 2 2 1 100 00 6489 77 78 26 86 35 80 33.33 48 75 1650 20
2 1 1 2 44.44 78.75 22.22 18.50 25 80 16.67 48.25 14.00
3 2 1 2 44.44 7575 22.22 30.00 28 60 33.33 58.67 15.50
4 2 1 1 88.89 7162 77.78 26.29 31 100 16.67 49.60 15.00
5 2 2 2 55.56 74 80 22.72 19.00 22 100 16.67 49.60 14.00
6 1 1 1 88 89 65 38 77.78 26.29 26 100 16 67 42 40 14.00 20
7 1 2 2 77.78 79.14 33.33 24.67 25 80 16.67 5475 15.00
8 1 2 1 100.00 69.11 77.78 22.43 29 100 16 67 48 80 15.00
Sub 7 1 1 1 2 88.89 7600 77 78 17.57 18 100 33.33 45 00 1750 40
2 2 2 1 100.00 6956 88.89 23.38 15 100 33.33 41 60 15.00 20
3 1 2 1 100.00 67.11 88.89 21.50 19 100 50.00 47.60 18.33 20
4 1 1 1 100.00 67 89 8889 17.62 30 100 33.33 41 20 1450
5 1 2 2 88.89 7338 55.56 12.60 18 100 33.33 30.80 19.00 20
6 2 1 1 100.00 6944 88.89 22.28 29 100 33.33 39.60 17.00
7 2 2 2 100.00 78.22 77.78 25.00 18 80 16.67 44.25 19.00 40
8 2 1 2 100 00 81.67 77 78 4200 17 60 16.67 59 67 14.00
Sub 8 1 2 1 2 77 78 67 14 33.33 56.33 20 60 0.00 4067 N
2 2 2 1 100.00 64 33 77.78 13.29 34 80 50.00 41 25 16 33
3 1 1 1 100.00 61.89 88.89 24.38 27 80 33.33 56.50 17.50
4 1 2 1 100.00 57.00 77.78 17.14 43 80 33.33 57.50 21.00
5 2 1 1 100.00 6889 100.00 26.44 24 100 33.33 39.80 20.50 20
6 1 2 2 100.00 72.67 66.67 28.50 19 100 33.33 45 60 14.00 40
7 2 2 2 100 00 67.78 8889 2488 19 100 16 67 46 80 1400 20
8 1 1 2 100.00 7567 77.78 34 57 11 80 16.67 56 50 14.00 20
Sub 9 1 1 2 2 44 44 70 75 3333 22.67 10 80 16 67 46 75 20 00 60
2 1 1 1 100.00 66 44 88.89 39.38 13 100 16.67 41 40 20.00 40
3 2 2 2 100.00 74.56 66.67 47.33 13 100 0.00 42.20 N 40
4 2 2 1 100.00 74.11 88.89 42.62 14 100 000 4680 N 40
5 1 1 2 100.00 9078 66.67 42.00 17 100 16.67 50 00 25.00 20
6 2 1 1 100.00 70 33 10000 34.00 16 100 50.00 3040 20 00 20
7 1 2 1 100.00 72 67 100.00 38.89 11 80 0.00 4775 N 40
8 2 1 2 100.00 8267 77 78 4586 6 100 16.67 47 60 1400 20
Sub 10 1 1 1 2 77.78 75 71 44.44 32.25 21 100 0.00 4680 N 20
2 1 2 1 100.00 6878 77.78 42.00 100 16.67 56 00 15.00
3 2 2 1 100.00 67.56 88.89 24.62 27 100 5000 55 60 19.00 20
4 2 2 2 100 00 81.11 77 78 48 14 10 80 16.67 4275 15.00 40
5 1 2 2 100.00 67.44 66.67 25.17 23 80 33.33 32 25 17.50 80
6 2 1 2 100.00 82.44 100 00 50.22 18 80 16 67 45 00 14.00
7 1 1 1 100.00 71.67 8889 34.88 27 100 33.33 33.60 20.00 20
8 2 1 1 100 00 7178 100.00 41 33 12 100 0.00 3960 N
Figure 3. Worksheet, Subjects 6-10
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Name Trial I L C BAFP1 BAFP2 BSP3 BSP4 BAFP12 Al SI A2 S2 A3
Sub 11 1 2 1 1 100 00 71.67 66 67 26 67 27 100 1667 60.00 14.00 20
2 2 2 2 100.00 77.56 44.44 27.50 19 100 16.67 46 00 18.00
3 1 2 1 100.00 7078 77.78 28.00 23 100 33.33 42.20 16.00
4 1 1 1 100.00 6900 100.00 23.67 23 100 16 67 40 60 20.00 20
5 2 1 2 88.89 83.00 77.78 33.00 13 100 16.67 55.30 14.00
6 1 1 2 88.89 80.75 88.89 30.38 11 100 0.00 5720 N 20
7 2 2 1 100.00 65.00 88.89 22.50 25 100 16.67 3440 20.00 20
8 1 2 2 100.00 7556 66.67 24.17 23 100 33.33 47 00 14.50 80
Sub 12 1 2 1 1 100.00 61 11 77 78 25.57 29 100 33.33 4540 17.50 80
2 1 2 1 100.00 73.00 77.78 24.29 21 100 33.33 47 40 17.00 40
3 2 2 2 100.00 82 56 66.67 39.00 16 100 33.33 50 00 15.50 60
4 2 2 1 100.00 62.67 8889 30.00 23 100 1667 50 20 15.00 40
5 2 1 2 100.00 81.67 66.67 44.33 23 100 16.67 4840 19.00 20
6 1 2 2 88.89 71.25 66.67 29.83 23 100 16.67 40 60 15.00 80
7 1 1 1 100.00 6833 88.89 22.00 36 100 50.00 40.00 20.00 20
8 1 1 2 10000 69 78 100 00 32 67 21 100 33.33 48 20 14.00
Sub 13 1 1 2 2 8889 71.00 66 67 23.83 17 100 33.33 47 40 17 00 80
2 2 2 2 100.00 78.22 66.67 44.50 15 100 0.00 53.28 N 20
3 1 1 1 100.00 68.22 88.89 32.25 18 100 16.67 33.60 20.00
4 1 2 1 100.00 69.56 88.89 1962 22 100 50.00 40.20 18.33 40
5 1 1 2 100.00 89 67 77.78 42 14 10 100 16.67 43 00 14.00 40
6 2 1 2 100.00 77 44 77.78 31 14 17 100 33.33 47 00 17.00
7 2 2 1 100.00 56.25 88.89 20.25 20 100 50.00 42.20 20.33 60
8 2 1 1 100.00 71.11 88.89 2175 25 100 33.33 4040 17.58
Sub 14 1 1 1 1 100 00 64 44 77 78 22.00 26 100 33.33 39 60 19.50
2 2 1 2 100.00 75.78 77.78 39.43 14 100 16.67 48.20 14.00
3 1 2 2 77.78 72.00 77.78 25.43 15 100 33.33 39.80 17.00 80
4 1 1 2 10000 77 78 88.89 3088 19 100 16 67 4940 15.00 20
5 1 2 1 100.00 67 11 88.89 22.88 23 100 33.33 38.60 17.00
6 2 2 2 88.89 76.62 77.78 37.00 12 100 0.00 4660 N 40
7 2 1 1 100.00 71 11 100.00 41.44 11 100 16.67 4940 19.00 20
8 2 2 1 88.89 6075 88.89 2062 28 100 50.00 41 00 20.00 40
Sub 15 1 1 2 1 100.00 5833 55.56 26.20 8 80 33.33 46.25 16 50
2 1 1 2 66 67 70.67 11.11 32.00 1 80 00 50 00 N
3 2 1 1 100.00 64 56 77 78 2271 22 100 50.00 43 80 16.33
4 2 1 2 100.00 70.78 66.67 19.83 18 100 50.00 56 00 20.00
5 1 1 1 100.00 61.33 66.67 26.50 14 100 16.67 44 80 18.00 20
6 2 2 2 100.00 75 1
1
55.56 15.60 18 100 33.33 48 20 16.50
7 1 2 2 88.89 7125 55.56 17.40 15 100 50.00 45.80 18.33 40
8 2 2 1 88.89 61.62 77 78 21.14 20 100 33 33 3940 14 50
Figure 4. Worksheet, Subjects 11-15
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Name Trial I L C BAFP1 BAFP2 BSP3 BSP4 BAFP12 Al SI A2 S2 A3
Sub 16 1 2 1 2 44 44 7275 44.44 39.00 21 80 0.00 3550 N 20
2 1 1 1 8889 67 75 7778 41.00 21 100 00 47 40 N
3 2 2 1 77.78 69.43 66.67 25.67 27 100 33.33 55 20 19.50 20
4 2 2 2 8889 64.00 77.78 38.29 18 100 16.67 39.00 19.00 20
5 2 1 1 100.00 69.44 100.00 45.44 19 100 16 67 48 00 19.00
6 1 1 2 100.00 89.44 100.00 52 67 21 100 16.67 47 40 15.00
7 1 2 1 100.00 7178 88.89 34 12 23 100 16 67 50 20 20.00 20
8 1 2 2 100 00 72.56 66.67 43.00 17 80 50.00 46 25 19.67 20
Figure 5. Worksheet, Subject 16
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Figure 6. Frequency Plot for BAFP 1
Figure 7. Frequency Plot for BAFP 2
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Figure 8. Frequency Plot for BSP 3
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Figure 9. Frequency Plot for BSP 4
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Figure 10. Frequency Plot for BAFP 12
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Figure 11. Frequency Plot for Al
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Figure 12. Frequency Plot for SI
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Figure 13. Frequency Plot for A2
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Figure 14. Frequency Plot for S2
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Figure 15. Frequency Plot for A3
39
40
































































— r -i t 1—
'
111 112 121 122 211 212 221 222
FACTORS






























111 112 121 122 211 212 221 222
FACTORS
Figure 17. BAFP 2 Box Plots
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Figure 20. BAFP 12 Box Plots
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Figure 23. A 2 Box Plots
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Figure 25. A3 Box Plots
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APPENDIX E. INTERACTION PLOTS
Figure 26. BAFP 1 Interaction Plots
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Figure 27. BAFP 2 Interaction Plots
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Figure 28. BSP 3 Interaction Plots
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Figure 29. BSP 4 Interaction Plots
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Figure 30. BAFP 12 Interaction Plots
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Figure 31. A 1 Interaction Plots
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Figure 32. S 1 Interaction Plots
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Figure 33. A 2 Interaction Plots
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Figure 34. S 2 Interaction Plots
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Figure 35. A3 Interaction Plots
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APPENDIX F. RESIDUALS PLOTS
Residual IVbdel Diagnostics BAFP1
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Figure 36. BAFP 1 Residuals Plots
Residual Model Diagnostics BAFP2
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Figure 37. BAFP 2 Residuals Plots
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Figure 38. BSP 3 Residuals Plots
63




































Figure 39. BSP 4 Residuals Plots
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Residual Model Dagnostics BAFP12
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Figure 40. BAFP 12 Residuals Plots
65
















































Figure 41. A 1 Residuals Plots
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iFtesidual Model Diagnostics S1

































































Figure 42. S 1 Residuals Plots
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Figure 43. A 2 Residuals Plots
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Figure 44. A3 Residuals Plots
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APPENDIX G. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
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Figure 45. Q4: Years Active Duty
Q5: Proficiency with NTDS Symboiogy
Figure 46. Q5: Proficiency with NTDS Symboiogy
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Q6: Proficiency with Wargames
4 Surface Warfare Officers
1 Air Defense Control
Frequency
Figure 47. Q6: Proficiency with Wargames
Q7: Proficiency as TAO
6 Surface Warfare
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Figure 49. Q8: Computer Proficiency
73
APPENDIX H. NULL HYPOTHESES REJECTION SUMMARY








Note: Reading this table horizontally provides a summary of the PMs for which the given null hypotheses were rejected. Reading the
table vertically provides an indication of the number of null hypotheses rejected for the given PM
Table 1. Rejection Summary
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APPENDIX I. NULL HYPOTHESES
H
i
Information Completeness has no impact on SAG performance.
H
al Information Completeness impacts SAG performance.
H02 Work Load has no impact on SAG performance.
H
a2 Work Load impacts SAG performance.
H03 FPB C2 has no impact on SAG performance.
H
a3 FPB C
2 impacts on SAG performance.
H04 The combined effect of Information Completeness and Work Load has no impact on
SAG performance.
Ha4 The combined effect of Information Completeness and Work Load impacts SAG
performance.
H05 The combined effect of Information Completeness and FPB C 2 has no impact on
SAG performance.
Ha5 The combined effect of Information Completeness and FPB C2 impacts on SAG
performance.
H06 The combined effect of Work Load and FPB C2 has no impact on SAG performance.
Ha6 The combined effect of Work Load and FPB C2 impacts on SAG performance.
H07 The combined effect of Information Completeness, Work Load and FPB C 2 has no
impact on SAG performance.
Ha7 The combined effect of Information Completeness, Work Load and FPB C
2 impacts
SAG performance.
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